Would it be possible to implement “graded vesting periods” for curation, wherein users do not receive bonding curve appreciation if they remove their signal before a certain period of time has passed?
For instance, let’s say there are graded vesting periods of:
28 days signaled = 1% bonding curve gain realized
90 days signaled = 15% bonding curve gain realized
180 days signaled = 50% bonding curve gain realized
365 days signaled = 100% bonding curve gain realized
How this would work:
User A signals a new subgraph. User B signals the same subgraph 1 hour later. One day later, User C, followed by several other users have signaled this subgraph, and now User A, User B, and User C’s shares are significantly larger than their initial signal.
User A waits 7 days and removes his/her signal. He/she receives 100% of his/her original signal (minus the signaling tax) + a cut of query fees amassed over the 7 days, but none of the bonding curve gains since he/she did not remain signaled for 28 days.
User B waits 108 days and removes his/her signal. He/she receives 100% of his/her original signal (minus the signaling tax) + a cut of query fees amassed over the 108 days + 15% of his/her bonding curve gains since he/she remained signaled for more than 90 days.
User C waits 210 days and removes his/her signal. He/she receives 100% of his/her original signal (minus the signaling tax) + a cut of query fees amassed over the 210 days + 50% of his/her bonding curve gains since he/she remained signaled for more than 180 days.
Any users who signaled for more than 365 days would receive 100% of his/her original signal (minus the signaling tax) + a cut of query fees amassed over the 365+ days + 100% of his/her bonding curve gains since he/she remained signaled for more than 365 days.
Obviously the grading system could be optimized by the core developers, indexers, and community, but overall, these rules would augment the positive principles of curation (vetting of legitimate subgraphs, maintenance of curation signal on quality subgraphs, incentivized locking of GRT in the network for longer periods of time), minimize the risk of curation for curators, and decrease the ability of bad actors to game the system (botting would be essentially pointless, and even if botting continued, it wouldn’t negatively affect honest curators in the same way).