I find a lot of what you wrote focuses on extremes or outlier examples. This conversation is not about zero sum going against large stakeholders.
- You mention that larger Indexers could just “spin up more nodes” if there was a smaller delegation ratio or cap was in place.
This is true, but you’d also have fairly linear scaling costs for infra and gas especially. Isn’t it better to have a diminishing incentive, which may give rise to large stakeholders considering delegation, over spinning up more Indexers?
It’s somewhat the inverse of how small stakes are cornered out of the market and can’t even consider to allocate to many subgraphs, if they want to make a profit. Which end of that spectrum do you think we should be worried about more?
“Despite on higher Effective reward cut. What a magic 
I believe that these numbers already help them to attract “retail holders”.”
This ignores the ACTUAL reality of the delegation weights of those you’re believing to attract these delegations. And yes, it would make sense to delegate to those with higher APY, but clearly that’s not what’s happening.
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You make a case that some Indexers who run multiple nodes are doing ok in aggregate terms, but they are not the common example.
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You then nullify point #2 by saying “these people are only doing well because they are being malicious”. Which is not only incorrect, but it’s contradictory to the point you were trying to make.
(Apologies for the edits, this forum isn’t that friendly to use on mobile)