Request for information about disputes #GDR-15

agreed on the above, there should not be a slash on his total stake now since it wasnt the same before, but rather proportional to his stake at that time

that said what Derek suggest actually sounds good imo!

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Dear all,

In light of the investigation carried out by @86b and the arguments presented by The Indexer, The Arbitrators found that there is enough evidence to consider there was an intentional behavior that affected the health of the protocol by manipulating the curation mechanism to provoke economic actions from honest indexers.

The basis for the decision is grounded on the core Motivation of the Arbitration Charter:

“The substance of the Arbitration charter is intended to ensure that the Arbitrator is fulfilling their role of supporting a healthy and functioning network where Indexers perform their work correctly, while minimizing the risk to honest Indexers of being economically penalized while interacting with the protocol in good faith.”

Therefore, The Arbitrators resolved to slash one of the disputes and draw the rest.

The following dispute is accepted as valid:
- Dispute (0x08de8c88793b5eda85ac752ca7d1482ef9bf7df8425a2601285e053ba38ff690)

At the time of this resolution the following disputes are out of scope due to the statute of limitations:
- Dispute (0xfc2573960d405e74a78c4064e26d6940772b00bdb1e226b4174b486acb52b14c)
- Dispute (0x2459556759390ef754bc57278c66053e62c7cead5b6008deb643ee5ab64df615)
- Dispute (0x77e4eacadef2fad67eb50def5e5ffe5bc277eee80c8261eb05371916fe8bbe86)
- Dispute (0x18604feebf50acfb974b608adc3f9fb99dd350ed4fae4b629fbd6b10f85bb136)

:zap: Executed transaction: Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan

Statute of Limitations

Section 6) of the charter defines “Indexers should not be slashed for faults that occurred more than two thawing periods prior." and in those case “The Arbitrator must decide any such dispute that is outside this statute of limitations as a Draw.". The Arbitrators interpretation of the charter is that a fault occurs at the epoch when the allocation is closed and the POI presented, not when the dispute is submitted.

Slashing Penalty

The community validly observed that the indexer increased the self-stake since the disputed allocations from 1.2M to 5M. It is worth pointing out that reducing the penalty might not be possible in every case, and it needs to be clear that if there were only one dispute, The Arbitrators would have to slash it in full, even if the penalty seems too high. We can see this situation happening when the indexer has a significant stake compared to the economic gain of even a single small allocation.

Recommendations

  • The Council should ensure the Charter clearly states that arbitration’s global objective is to foster a healthy protocol. The Arbitrators propose moving the text from the “Motivation” section (https://snapshot.org/#/council.graphprotocol.eth/proposal/0xcbf3f710450972388cb68a6389e6298a8fd8ae114d8137488467fc3f38c123a1) to the body of the Charter as a section on its own (https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmaENLieqnQ9ronsPexUzNbHysWDrhDgKvydZQCbLB16kw)
  • Update the Charter to add a specific clause about indexing rewards manipulation through gaming the curation mechanism to avoid doubt that this is a penalized behavior.
  • The Council should ask the Protocol Economics Working Group to review the current design for the distribution of indexing rewards through Curation, and to devise a mechanism that eliminates any room for interpretation and the need for social consensus.
  • The Council should ask the Operation Working Group to design and implement monitoring to support the arbitration of future similar cases.
  • Review how to graduate the slashing penalty, for example, considering the allocated stake instead of the entire indexer stake.

We understand that these recommendations may not be the only possible solutions. We hope that these suggestions will be given careful consideration as plans for the future are made.

Sincerely,
The Arbitrators

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Still no disputes on the guy that is actively manipulating the small subgraph market and rugs all the small indexers. Casually waiting for Derek or Vince to do it, since they’re so vocal about this behavior. :slight_smile:

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As I said at the beginning of this practice: the current design of slashing\arbitration is incentivizing to slash only big players or choose bigger than smaller. Just because of economical reasons.
I still think that the behavior discussed in this topic is not so healthy, but cases like this are great from the “Let’s talk about issues in the system design” point of view.

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