An Arbitration Charter to clarify Arbitrator behavior

About subgraph failure I agree with this point from Zac, as long as it was a deterministic failure because of a bug from the subgraph developer it makes sense for the network to keep indexing it because it can still provide query results, even if not until the latest block, there is value in that. It would be interesting to consider an addendum to the charter with this condition.

Slashing could be a function of the allocated tokens and allocation duration to not overly penalize indexers that rotate allocations more frequently, today they are exposed to more risk than slow rotating indexers. We would need to calculate that the allocation security bond is enough to cover what an indexer gets from rewards to avoid any potential exploit.


Update: I have updated clause 9 of the arbitration charter based on the feedback above, and have pushed the changes to Radicle (commit # 7b9cfa81242697b86ca87f9d09e5d1fabe87399c).

I accept Zac’s point above that it could be useful to historically query a broken subgraph, or even know that a subgraph is broken, and what the error is, which is only possible if Indexers are online to report on it’s broken state.

Also, philosophically, it makes sense to me that it is the Curators who signaled on the subgraph that should determine when they no longer wish a broken subgraph to be indexed by migrating their signal. There is no need for the protocol to make this decision on their behalf.

I disagree with @KonstantinRM’s suggestion to only make indexing rewards slashable and not Indexer’s principal stake. Such a change would make the expected profit positive for a whole class of economic attacks, because there would essentially be no downside to attempting such attacks other than the opportunity cost of capital involved in the attack, which is a near-zero interest rate environment is relatively low.

I agree, however, w/ Ariel’s point about possibly only making allocated stake slashable, as opposed to an Indexer’s entire stake. This is actually already listed under “Future Work” in the GIP because this requires a code change and thus goes beyond the narrow norm-setting capabilities of the Arbitration Charter.


We still need to clarify the question(I believe it was good enough clarified in the charter, but people still discussing it):

  1. If the subgraph failed, is it ok to start allocating on it after it’s failed or not? Because for now, we have a situation, when Indexers can keep allocation open for failed Indexer if they already there, but can’t open allocation for an already failed subgraph.

Speaking about “allocated stake” it looks much better than the current state. Because for now Indexer can create a new Indexer with 1M self stake → delegate 16M to itself and do everything they want. Why:

  1. Nobody will create disputes for him, because of too low ratio: Fisherman’s bid vs 1.25% slashable body. Plus up to 56 epochs of waiting, freezing fisherman’s tokens.
  2. Potential rewards from 17M allocated malicious way will be much higher than 2.5% slashing for his 1M self-stake. Especially with reallocating once per 28 epochs.

Potential rewards from 17M allocated malicious way will be much higher than 2.5% slashing for his 1M self-stake. Especially with reallocating once per 28 epochs.

Regarding slashing allocated stake instead of own stake, the issue here is that you are adding slashing to delegators basically, which is a new risk that wasn’t there before.

You can slash percentage of the owned stake based on allocated stake. So it’s not that bad.

So say you have 100M own stake and 500M total allocated, and you only allocated 50M on a subgraph, then the slashing is considered on the 10% of your own stake (equivalent to the allocation basically).

So slash on 10M by 2.5% in today’s slash percent.

Sorry if my math is off but you get the idea.

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Indexers are starting to allocate to Opyn again. Any Indexer with a small stake can jump on this with low likelihood of disputes due to lack of incentive as the numbers are too low to warrant one. GRT earned per million allocated is something like 3000GRT per day with current numbers. They will likely eventually close allocations with the last good PoI. OR any poi that works, because they are less concerned about getting slashed at such an high rate of indexer rewards.

Maybe this is less of a problem once we have a lot more signal, but its for sure a strange/unique situation right now. No pressing incentive (for now) for the signaller to move that Opyn signal until they upgrade their sub. Signal I agree, per @Brandon s thoughts, is ideally how these dynamics become irrelevant in the future.


Another funny part of Opyn allocations:

It seems like more than 28 epochs, but allocations are still open.

The rewards manager cuts rewards after 28 epochs the moment you close the allo and calculates the rewards. So all that person does is to shoot themselves in the foot lol